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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
INVALIDATES A DISCOVERY STATUTE THAT
CONFLICTED WITH A RULE OF PROCEDURE
State v. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d 611 (N.D. 1996)
I. FACTS
On March 14, 1995, Dale Clayton Hanson was arrested and charged
with driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance.' In prepa-
ration for trial in Morton County District Court, Hanson's attorney
requested discovery of the prosecution witnesses and their statements,
under Rule 16(f)(1) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2
The State complied with Hanson's request and in turn asked for
discovery of the defense witnesses, and any statements they may have
made, under Section 29-01-32 of the North Dakota Century Code.3
Hanson made a motion to limit the information he must disclose to that
which is defined under Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4
Hanson further insisted that Section 29-01-32 is unconstitutional, and as
such, he had no duty to disclose information. 5
The district court determined that Section 29-01-32 is unconstitu-
tional because it violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Article
VI, Section 3 of the North Dakota Constitution. 6 The district court fur-
ther ruled that Hanson need only disclose information pursuant to Rule
16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7 On appeal and in a unanimous
decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that section 29-01-32
was in direct conflict with Rule 16 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
1. State v. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d 611, 611 (N.D. 1996).
2. Id. Hanson's attorney also requested discovery of documents, tangible objects, and reports of
examinations and tests under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), -(D) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Id.
3. Id. In addition, the prosecution asked for discovery of examinations and tests, and any other
evidence the defense intended to use at trial, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 611-12. Article VI, section 3 provides that "[tihe supreme court shall have the authority
to promulgate the rules of procedure" of the courts. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
7. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 611-12.
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Procedure, and was, therefore, a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 8
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Article XI, Section 26 of the North Dakota Constitution creates the
Separation of Powers Doctrine by stating that "[t]he legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches are coequal branches of government." 9 This
language creates the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 10 The Separation of
Powers Doctrine establishes a balance of power between the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government." The creation of the
three branches acts as a partition of governmental power with an
"implied exclusion of each branch from the exercise of the functions of
the others."12 Harmony within the government can best be achieved if
each branch exercises restraint when dealing with powers exclusively
vested in another branch.13
When determining whether a statute violates the Separation of Pow-
ers Doctrine, the courts must rely on a few settled principles. 14 First, the
8. Id. at 615-16. Generally, the state would not be allowed to appeal a trial court's decision
unless permitted by statute. See City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530, 535 (N.D. 1970).
However, pursuant to Article VI, section 4 of the North Dakota Constitution, only the North Dakota
Supreme Court, by agreement of at least four justices, may determine that a statute is unconstitutional.
N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4. Section 4 provides that, "[a] majority of the supreme court shall be
necessary to constitute a quorum or to pronounce a decision, provided that the supreme court shall not
declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at least four of the members of the court so
decide." Id. This language eliminates the possibility of one district judge invalidating a statute enacted
by the legislature, without appeal. Materi, 177 N.W.2d at 537. As such, the court in Hanson allowed
the state to appeal the district court's ruling. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 612.
9. N.D. CONST. art. Xl, § 26,
10. See State ex rel Spaeth v. Meiers, 403 N.W.2d 392, 394 (N.D. 1987) (acknowledging that the
creation of the three branches of government is a separation of the powers, and recognizing that each
branch is allocated different responsibilities).
II. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 615; see State v. Kromarek, 52 N.W.2d 713, 714 (N.D. 1952); see
also ex rel Spaeth, 403 N.W.2d at 394 (emphasizing that Article XI, section 26 of the constitution
apportions varying tenets of power to each branch of government). Other jurisdictions conform to the
same theory of separation of powers. See generally Schwarzkopf v. Sac County, 341 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa
1983); Collins v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 395 N.W.2d 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Neighborhood
Sch. Coalition v. Independent Sch. Dist., 484 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); State ex rel Sheppard
v. Nebraska Equal Opportunity Comm'n, 557 N.W.2d 684 (Neb. 1997); Cary v. City of Rapid City, 559
N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1997); Joni B. v. State, 549 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1996).
12. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 611 n. I (quoting ex rel Spaeth, 403 N.W.2d at 394).
13. Id. at 615. The Separation of Powers principle is not confined to North Dakota law, but is a
fundamental theory of American government. Verry v. Trenbeath, 148 N.W.2d 567, 570 (N.D.
1967); see Kromarek, 52 N.W.2d at 714-15. The United States also adheres to the separation of
powers doctrine set forth in the United States Constitution. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 294
(1979). The underlying meaning of "separation of powers" is that "the whole power of one
department should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the
other departments, and that no one department ought to possess directly or indirectly an overruling
influence over the others." Id. The Separation of Powers principle is sometimes considered the most
important principle of government because the system of checks and balances created by the coequal
branches is necessary to sustain the freedom and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. § 296.
14. Verry, 148 N.W.2d at 570.
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North Dakota Constitution provides for limits on power, not grants of
power.15 Therefore, the person challenging the constitutionality of a
statute must specify which provision of the constitution limits the power
of the legislature, and prevents them from enacting the statute. 16 Second,
the court must attempt to find the statute valid under the constitution if
possible. 17 Finally, if there is any doubt as to the validity of a statute, the
court must determine that the statute is constitutional.18
A major issue in any separation of powers dispute is assessing the
exclusive functions of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.19
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly where the power of
the judiciary ends and the power of the legislature begins, and vice-
versa.20 According to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the legislature
has the power to determine the best policies for the future and enacts
them into law. 2 1 The judiciary construes the law, examines its constitu-
tionality, and determines the rights granted under the law as it is en-
acted. 22 Finally, the executive branch has the power to administer the
law as it is enacted. 23 Since there is no bright line distinction between the
respective powers, the decision of whether a function is legislative,
judicial, or executive, must be made on a case-by-case basis.24
One of the first North Dakota cases to raise the Separation of
Powers issue was Glaspell v. City of Jamestown.25 Glaspell involved a
challenge to a law whereby landowners could change city boundaries by
petitioning the city council.2 6 If the city council denied a landowners'
request, the statute allowed the landowners to petition the district court,
which would have the power to grant or deny the petition. 27 On appeal,
the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the law was unconstitutional





19. See Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, 88 N.W. 1023, 1023 (N.D. 1902) (noting that some states
have found that determining city boundaries is a responsibility delegated to the judiciary, while other
states have found it to be a legislative function).
20. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 297.
21. State v. Kromarek, 52 N.w.2d 713, 715 (N.D. 1952).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 13, § 297.
25. 88 N.W. 1023, 1023-24 (N.D. 1902) (arguing that the district courts did not have jurisdiction
to grant relief to the petitioner because the adjustment of city limits is traditionally a legislative matter).
26. Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, 88 N.W. 1023, 1024 (N.D. 1902). Glaspell and others owned
land within the city limits of Jamestown. Id. at 1023. Since the land was pasture and farmland which
did not benefit the city, the landowners wanted it removed from the city limits. Id. The law allowed
the removal to take place, assuming that a petition was brought before the city council. Id. at 1024.
27. Id. The city council denied the petition, so the landowners brought the matter to the district
court, and the petition was granted. Id. at 1023.
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judicial function. 28 Since this matter was not within the powers delegated
to the judiciary by the constitution, the district court impermissibly
performed a legislative function. 29
The North Dakota Supreme Court continued its strict adherence to
the Separation of Powers Doctrine in State v. Baker.30 The court in
Baker considered the constitutionality of the Recodification Act and the
group created by the Act called the Code Revision Commission. 31 The
Commission's members were chosen by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, and under the court's control. 32 The Commission performed
many functions, including revising the laws of the state.33 The constitu-
tionality of this scheme was challenged on the grounds that the Commis-
sion was performing legislative duties while under the supervision of the
court.
3 4
The court stated that its powers originate exclusively from the consti-
tution, and "[n]o duties can be assigned to the court that it, under its
judicial powers granted by the constitution, could not perform without
specific legislative assignment." 35 The majority held that, because the
Commission was performing legislative acts while under the control of
the supreme court, the Recodification Act was an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 36
Under Separation of Powers, each branch must refrain from exer-
cising functions delegated to the other branches. 37 As an example, in
Spaeth v. Meiers,38 the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to grant an
28. Id. at 1026. The creation or change of city boundaries is a legislative function under the con-
stitution which provides in part, "[tihe legislative assembly shall provide by general law for the
organization of municipal corporations." N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130. The determination of whether a
function is legislative, judicial, or executive can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Glaspell, 88
N.W. at 1026 (noting that although North Dakota courts routinely hold that creating and changing city
boundaries is a legislative function, courts in other states have held that it is a purely judicial function).
A court in one jurisdiction may find the function judicial, while a court in another jurisdiction may find
it legislative. Id.
29. Glaspell, 88 N.W. at 1026; see also City of Carrington v. Foster County, 166 N.W.2d 377, 385
(N.D. 1969) (finding a statute which granted authority to the district courts to hear annexation petitions
unconstitutional because it was an unlawful delegation of legislative powers which violated the
Separation of Powers Doctrine).
30. 288 N.W. 202, 210 (N.D. 1939) (finding the Recodification Act of 1939 unconstitutional).
31. State v. Baker, 288 N.W. 202, 203 (N.D. 1939).
32. Id.
33. Id. Other duties of the Commission were to "prepare, annotate and index a complete set of
rules of practice and procedure for all courts of the state .... [and] to revise, annotate and index the
laws of the state." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 209. The Supreme Court of North Dakota stated that the Legislature cannot delegate
duties to the courts unless it passes a test. Id. The test is whether the duties delegated could have been
performed by the court under its general powers. Id.
36. Id.
37. State ex rel Spaeth v. Meiers, 403 N.W.2d 392, 394 (N.D. 1987).
38. 403 N.W.2d 392 (N.D. 1987).
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application for a writ of mandamus because the dispute bringing about
the application was over interpretation of the procedural rules of the
legislature. 39 The court stated that, if the issue was whether or not the
procedural rules were constitutional, then it would be within its power to
make such a determination.4 0 However, under the constitution, each
branch of government makes its own rules of procedure and it is the
duty of that branch to make any and all interpretations of those rules.4 '
Consequently, the court refused to intervene in a clearly legislative
matter.42
Notwithstanding its power to enact procedural rules, the court
recognizes a statute affecting those rules. 43 The court also acknowledges
statutes that supplement the rules and/or function with the existing
rules. 44 For instance, in City of Fargo v. Ruether,45 the City argued that
Section 39-20-14 of the North Dakota Century Code conflicted with
Rules 401 and 402 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 46 At issue
was the admissibility of an Alcohol Level Evaluation Roadside Tester
(A.L.E.R.T.) alcohol screening test.47 Section 39-20-14 states that the
results of the roadside test must be used "only for determining whether
or not a further test shall be given." 48 The City argued that this statute
conflicts with Rules 401 and 402 which makes any relevant evidence
admissible. 49 On appeal for the suppression of the A.L.E.R.T. test, the
North Dakota Supreme Court found no conflict between the statute and
the Rules of Evidence. 50 Although the Rules of Evidence prevail over
conflicting statutes, the legislature is given much latitude in regards to
admissibility of evidence. In addition, Rule 402 explicitly states that
statutes may be enacted that make relevant evidence inadmissible. 51
Only when a statute conflicts with a rule will the court invalidate the
statute. 52 The precedent in North Dakota, and the decision in Spaeth, is
39. State ex rel Spaeth, 403 N.W.2d at 394. The matter in dispute was whether the President of
the Senate can refuse to accept a bill sent to the Senate by the House because it did not pass by a




43. State v. Vetsch, 368 N.W.2d 547, 552 (N.D. 1985) (quoting State v. Seidel, 691 P.2d 678, 682
(Ariz. 1984)).
44. Id.
45. 490 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1992).
46. City of Fargo v. Ruether, 490 N.W.2d 481, 484 (N.D. 1992).
47. Id. at 482.
48. Id. at 483.
49. Id. at 484.
50. Id.
51. Id. "Unless there is a conflict, a statutory rule supplements our rules of evidence." Id. at
483.
52. State v. Vetsch, 368 N.W.2d 547, 552 (N.D. 1985); see also McDougall v. Eliuk, 554 N.W.2d
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that each branch has exclusive control over its rules of procedure. As
such, it is no surprise that the court in Hanson found that a statute, which
controlled discovery procedures, conflicted with the court enacted rules
of procedure.
III. ANALYSIS
Writing for the majority in Hanson, Justice Neumann considered at
whether Section 29-01-32 conflicted with an existing procedural rule,
and if so, whether the statute violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
Section 29-01-32 states in part:
1. Upon the prosecuting attorney's compliance with a
written request of the defendant for disclosure under . . . Rule
16 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant, upon written request by the prosecuting attorney,
shall reciprocate in kind and disclose to the prosecuting
attorney:
a. The names and addresses of persons, other than the
defendant, the defendant's attorney intends to call as witnesses
at trial, together with any relevant written or recorded state-
ments of those persons or reports of the statements of those
persons ... ,53
Rule 16, on the other hand provides, in part:
(b) Disclosure of evidence by the defendant.
(2) Information not subject to disclosure. [T]his subdivi-
sion does not authorize the discovery or inspection ... of state-
ments made by the defendant or by prospective prosecution or
defense witnesses to the defendant, or to the defendant's agents
or attorneys.
(f)(1) Upon written request of the defendant, the prose-
cution shall furnish to the defendant a written list of the names
and addresses of all prosecution witnesses, and any statements
made by them, whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call
in the presentation of the case in chief, together with any
56, 58-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that the Supreme Court's rule-making powers are
superior to the powers of the legislature in matters of court procedures); State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d
551, 554 (Minn. 1994) (finding that when dealing with court procedures, the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court take precedence over statutes); State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. 1992)
(stating that the North Dakota Supreme Court has the ultimate authority over the procedural rules of
the court). But see Butler v. Woodbury County, 547 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Iowa. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding
that the courts may proscribe procedural rules subject to the rules enacted by the legislature); In re
E.B., 330 N.W.2d 584, 588 (Wis. 1983) (recognizing that the legislature has ultimate control over the
courts' procedural rules).
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-32 (1995), repealed by S.L. 1997, ch 51, § 40 (emphasis added).
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records of prior felony convictions of any of those witnesses
which are within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney. 54
The State conceded that the Rule 16 requirement for disclosure of
statements or reports of statements by defense witnesses conflicts with a
portion of Section 29-01-32.55 The State argued that the section of the
statute that required disclosure of "names and address of persons the
defendant intends to call as witnesses at trial" was not in conflict with
Rule 16 in that Rule 16 does not expressly address the disclosure of
names and addresses of defense witnesses. 56 Consequently, the State
argued that only the portion of the statute in conflict with Rule 16 could
be found unconstitutional. 57
The court looked to Article VI, Section 3 of the constitution, which
provides that: "[T]he supreme court shall have authority to promulgate
rules of procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all
the courts of this state . . "58 Although the constitution states that the
supreme court has the authority to promulgate the rules of procedure for
the courts, the State argued that interplay between rules and statutes is
common and valid, 59 evidenced by evidentiary statutes.60
For example, the court examined Rule 43(a) of North Dakota Rules
of Civil Procedure and Rule 26 of North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provide in part that "evidence shall be admitted which
is admissible under the statutes of this state, . . . or other rules adopted by
the North Dakota Supreme Court." 6 1 The court acknowledged that the
procedural rules allow for a great deal of deference to be given to the
legislature.62 The court looked to other law that contains phrases such as
"unless otherwise provided by law," and found this language to be
necessary in the rule before there can be any interplay between statutes
54. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 16 (emphasis added).
55. State v. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d 611, 613 (N.D. 1996).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. N.D. CONST. art VI, § 3.
59. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 613-14. Interplay between statutes and rules has been found valid in
some cases. See City of Fargo v. Ruether, 490 N.W.2d 481, 484 (N.D. 1992) (concluding that there
was no conflict between § 39-20-14 and rules 401 and 402 of the Rules of Evidence); City of Fargo v.
Dawson, 466 N.W.2d 584, 586 (N.D. 1991) (finding no disagreement between rule 23(a) of the Rules
of Procedure and §§ 27-07.1-31, -32 of the North Dakota Century Code, which all address with
waiver of a jury trial).
60. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 613-14; see also Ruether, 490 N.W.2d at 483 (explaining that
statutes not in conflict with rules are used to supplement the rules).
61. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 26; N.D. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
62. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 614; see also People v. McDonald, 505 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that the legislature may enact statutory rules of evidence as long as they do not
conflict with rules promulgated by the supreme court); State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Minn.
1990) (stating that the legislature has the power to enact evidentiary statutes that do not conflict with
the rules of evidence).
1998]
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and rules. 63 However, the court rejected the state's argument of valid
interplay in this case, because the portion of Article VI, Section 3 that
confers onto the supreme court the power to create the Rules of
Procedure does not contain such language. 64 Therefore, the court found
the creation of the Rules of Procedure to be the exclusive function of the
supreme court. 65
The court then looked at Article XI, Section 26 of the North Dakota
Constitution which states that "[t]he legislative, executive, and judicial
branches are coequal branches of government." 66 The court interpreted
the creation of coequal branches of government to mean there is an
apportionment of power between the separate branches, each having
responsibility in certain areas.67
The court ultimately determined that the portion of Section 29-01-
32 that requires disclosure of names and addresses of defense witnesses
is in direct conflict with Rule 16, because Rule 16 requires no such
disclosure. 68 By the order of Article VI, Section 3, any statute in conflict
with a rule of procedure must yield to the rule. 69 Therefore, the court
found that portion of Section 29-01-32 unconstitutional. 70 The court
further concluded that Section 29-01-32 focused primarily on the
requirement that the defense disclose names, addresses, and other infor-
mation about defense witnesses, since the legislature would not have
enacted the statute without such provisions. 7 1 If the main premise of the
statute is unconstitutional, then any peripheral statutory requirements are
also unconstitutional. Consequently, the court held that all of Section
29-01-32 was unconstitutional, and affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.
7 2
63. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 614. For example, Article VI, Section 3 of the North Dakota Consti-
tution provides that: "The supreme court shall have authority ... , unless otherwise provided by law, to
promulgate rules and regulations for the admission to practice, conduct, disciplining, and disbarment of
attorneys at law." N.D. CONST. art VI, § 3 (emphasis added).
64. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 614. "The supreme court shall have authority to promulgate rules of
procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all the courts of this state; ... N.D.
CONST. art VI, § 3.
65. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 614.
66. N.D. CoNsT. art. XI, § 26.
67. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 614.
68. Id. at 615.
69. Id.; City of Fargo v. Dawson, 466 N.W.2d 584, 586 n.4 (N.D. 1991).
70. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 615.
71. Id.; see also City of Carrington v. Foster County, 166 N.W.2d 377, 385 (N.D. 1969) (invalidat-
ing an entire statute because an integral portion of it was unconstitutional). Finding part of a statute
unconstitutional does not necessarily mean that the entire statute is unconstitutional. Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978). The entire statute is unconstitutional only if "all provisions are so
connected and dependent upon each other that it cannot be presumed that the legislature would have
enacted the valid sections without the unconstitutional sections." Id.




Following Hanson, the North Dakota Supreme Court again had to
consider the issue of Separation of Powers in Traynor v. Leclerc.73
Traynor involved the constitutionality of North Dakota Century Code
Section 29-15-21 which allows an individual or an attorney to demand
in writing that a judge be removed from a case. 74 Traynor sought a
declaratory judgment and injunction in district court, but he did not want
to argue the case in front of the assigned judge.75 As such, Traynor
invoked Section 29-15-21, but the presiding judge denied the request on
the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. 76
Traynor petitioned for supervisory writs to vacate the order by the
presiding judge that denied the request for a change.77 Upon granting
the petitions and holding that the statute was constitutional, the supreme
court echoed its reasoning in Hanson that the constitution apportions
different classes of power to each branch of government, 78 and a rule of
procedure, when in conflict with a statute, must prevail over the statute. 79
The court added that when deciding issues of conflict between rules of
procedure and statutes, the court will try to harmonize them if possible. 80
The court also stated that statutes have a "conclusive presumption of
constitutionality" unless clearly violative of the constitution. 81
The North Dakota Supreme Court expanded Hanson, in that it con-
sidered the public policy underlying the enactment of the statutes. 82
Although the supreme court has the authority to enact rules of proce-
dure, the legislature has an interest and a duty to enact laws that ensure a
fair trial.8 3 Therefore, the Separation of Powers Doctrine does not neces-
sarily bar the legislature from creating statutes that further public policy
interests, even if the legislation in some way affects the courts. 84
The Hanson decision did not alter the way the courts have tradition-
ally looked at Separation of Powers issues. The more important impact
73. 1997 N.D. 47, 14, 561 N.W.2d 644, 649 (holding that a change of judge statute was not a
violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine).
74. Traynor v. Leclerc, 1997 N.D. 47, 2, 561 N.W.2d at 645-46 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §
29-15-21 (1995)).
75. Id.
76. Id. 1 4, 561 N.W.2d at 646.
77. Id.
78. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d at 611 n.1.
79. Id. at 615.
80. Traynor, 1997 N.D. 47, 8, 561 N.W.2d at 647 (citing Murdoff v. Murdoff, 517 N.W.2d 402,
403 (N.D. 1994)).
81. Id. 1 8 (quoting State v. Ertelt, 548 N.W.2d 775, 776 (ND. 1996)).
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of Hanson may be procedural. Section 29-01-32, which was invalidated
in Hanson, provided for reciprocal discovery in criminal cases. 85 With
the decision in Hanson, defense attorneys do not need to reveal the
names of witnesses they intend to call. As a result, the question remains
whether this will affect the prosecution's ability to effectively prepare for
a case, and whether this will lead to "trial by ambush," 86 which courts
have historically frowned upon. 87 "The discovery statutes are there to
eliminate trial by ambush." 88 Trial by ambush goes against the concept
of "fundamental fairness." 89 Reciprocal discovery furthers the goals of
a fair and speedy presentation of the evidence, and a fair ascertainment
of the truth. 90 Discovery procedures should be such that surprise would
be removed from criminal trials, as well as civil trials. 91
Hanson may also pave the way for challenges to statutes incorpor-
ating other rules of procedure. For example, refer to Section 32-03.2-
11, which details the manner in which a party must seek punitive
damages. 92 Section 32-03.2-11(1) provides in part:
Upon commencement of the action, the complaint may
not seek exemplary damages. After filing the suit, a party may
make a motion to amend the pleadings to claim exemplary
damages. The motion must allege an applicable legal basis for
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-32 (1995), repealed by S.L. 1997, ch.51, § 40.
86. Prosecutors might not be affected by the absence of Section 29-01-32. Telephonic interview
with Robert Woods, Defense Attorney (Oct. 1, 1997). A prosecutor may not be able to cross-examine
as thoroughly if the prosecutor does not know who the defense witnesses are until trial, but with
reasonable investigation, the identity of those witnesses should be readily ascertainable. Id. Also, the
burden of proof is on the prosecutor, and his or her efforts should be towards meeting that burden
instead of refuting testimony of defense witnesses. Id. If a prosecutor presents a strong case, defense
witnesses are not as significant. Id. Knowing the identity of defense witnesses is obviously helpful for
a prosecutor, but is not a necessary tool for a fair trial. Interview with Bruce Quick, Defense Attor-
ney, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Feb. 25, 1998) (Mr. Quick worked as a prosecutor from 1979 to 1989). If
production of the names of the defense witnesses is found to be necessary for the prosecutor, then the
Joint Procedures Committee can amend the Rules of Criminal Procedure just as the Committee did with
the alibi defense. Id.; see N.D. R. CRIM. P. 12.1.
87. See Tormaschy v. Tormaschy, 1997 N.D. 2, 13, 559 N.W.2d 813, 816 (stating that trial by
ambush is not an acceptable trial practice); see also Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 941 F.Supp. 853, 857-58
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (arguing that Enron's failure to disclose the names of two witness was trial by
ambush).
88. State v. McKee, 314 N.W.2d 866, 869 (S.D. 1989) (Henderson, J., concurring).
89. Strong v. Brushafer, 519 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). Wisconsin courts have held
that the prosecutor and the accused should be on a level playing field. State v. Maday, 507 N.W.2d
365, 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Wis. STAT. § 971.23 (1975). "[Tjhe truth is most likely to emerge when
each side seeks to take the other by reason rather than by surprise." Maday, 507 N.W.2d at 369
(quoting 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISREAL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3, at 475-76 (1984)).
90. People v. Loyer, 425 N.W.2d 714, 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (Boyle, J., concurring and
dissenting).
91. State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 1969). Reciprocal discovery may trigger concerns
under the Fifth and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. See generally Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
CASE COMMENT
awarding exemplary damages and must be accompanied by
one or more affidavits showing the factual basis for the claim.93
By virtue of this statute, the legislature is controlling the pleadings
of a case.94 One could argue that these pleadings would fall under the
rules of procedure, and thus under the control of the courts. Therefore,
this statute could be a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine as
established with Hanson. Following Traynor, one must also inquire as to
the public policy the legislature is trying to further by not allowing an
attorney to plead punitive damages in the complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
In Hanson, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that reciprocal
discovery of the names and addresses of defense witnesses under Section
29-01-32 is an unconstitutional violation of the Separation of Powers
Doctrine. The supreme court has long adhered to the Separation of
Powers Doctrine, so the main issue continues to be distinguishing what is





94. See id. (requiring a party seeking exemplary damages to amend the pleadings to contain such
damages).
95. 1 am a proud graduate of NDSU. I would like to thank my parents, my sister, Shannen, and
Toby. I also want to thank Liz V., Robyn Y., Jamie M., Lee D., and all my close friends. This article
is dedicated to the memory of my second mother, Margaret Yon, and my grandparents whom I miss
very much.
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